WHAT DOES DINNER COST?

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THE COST OF MEALS

Early work on the cost of lunch: Hume, Goodman, Wolpert

- Later work, not in the GA literature: Koehler, Ho, Dembski, Pepyne, Zhao, Zhu, Rohwer, Schaffer, Spears, Perakh, Forster, Cataltepe, Abu-mostafa, Magdon-ismail
- Later work, in the GA literature: Macready, English, Whitley, Schmumacher, Vose, De Jong, Christensen, Oppacher, Corne, Knowles, Culberson, Droste, Jansen, Wegener, Igel, Toussaint, Jansen, Montgomery, Radcliffe, Surry, Shallit, Woodward, Neil
- Work on the cost of other meals: Godel, Turing, Landauer, Moore, Wolpert, Lloyd

ROADMAP



NFL FOR SEARCH - DEFINITIONS

- 1) Input space X, and Output space Y.
- 2) <u>Objective Function</u> $f: X \rightarrow Y$
- 3) m (distinct) sampled points of f:

 $d_{m} = \{d_{m}(1), d_{m}(2), ..., d_{m}(m)\}$ where $\forall t$, $d_{m}(t) = \{d_{m}^{X}(t), d_{m}^{Y}(t)\}$

- 4) <u>Search algorithm</u> $a = \{d_t \rightarrow d_m^X(t+1): t = 0, ..., m\}$ (Typically no repeats allowed.)
- 5) Real-valued Cost function $C(d_m)$

Obvious extensions to stochastic f, a.

NFL FOR SEARCH - PRIMARY RESULT

$$\sum_{f} P(d_{m}^{Y} \mid f, m, a) = \sum_{f} P(d_{m}^{Y} \mid f, m, a')$$
$$\forall a, a', d_{m}$$

So for any C(.), and any set of f's, Φ :



NFL FOR SEARCH - PRIMARY RESULT

$$\sum_{f} P(d_{m}^{Y} \mid f, m, a) = \sum_{f} P(d_{m}^{Y} \mid f, m, a')$$
$$\forall a, a', d_{m}$$

- 1) Same result for many non-uniform averages over f
- 2) Same result if average over P(f)'s

Must use knowledge about f to choose a. (Saying "realworld P(f) non-uniform" doesn't justify any particular a.) NFL FOR SEARCH - PRIMARY RESULT

$$\sum_{f} P(d_{m}^{Y} \mid f, m, a) = \sum_{f} P(d_{m}^{Y} \mid f, m, a')$$
$$\forall a, a', d_{m}$$

NFL quantifies real-world luck ("intelligence") of a:
i) Recall lower C is better.

ii) $C \leq \varepsilon \Rightarrow$ our luck in the match of f to a (which we chose before we saw any data) is at least K(ε).

iii) $K(\varepsilon)$ is a function of m, |Y|, and choice of C(.), e.g., $C(d_m) = \min_t \{d_m^Y(t)\} \implies P(C \mid m, a)$ is a Gumbel

distribution for large m. (Use NFL and random a.)

GEOMETRY OF SEARCH

$$P(d_m^Y | m, a) = a_{d_m^Y, m} \bullet p$$
where
$$p = P(f), \ a_{d_m^Y, m} = P(d_m^Y | m, a, f)$$
are both vectors indexed by f

- 1) Similarly for $E(C \mid m, a)$, etc.
- 2) Intuition: a must be aligned with P(f) or else.
- 3) NFL theorem: All $a_{d_{u}^{y},m}$ have same projection on diagonal p
- 4) All deterministic $a_{d_m^Y,m}$ have same Euclidean magnitude

AVERAGES OVER ALGORITHMS

- *Rather than fix a and average over f, do the opposite:*
- 1) Let G and H be <u>choosing procedure</u> maps:
 {[d (generated by a); d'(generated by a')]} → {a, a'}
- 2) Let $c_{>m}$ be the costs in a subsequent set of k samples of f.

$$\sum_{a,a'} P(c_{>m} \mid f, m, k, a, a', G) = \sum_{a,a'} P(c_{>m} \mid f, m, k, a, a', H)$$
$$\forall m, k, G, H, \text{ and any } f$$

3) Since the sum is independent of f, all this holds for any P(f).

AVERAGES OVER ALGORITHMS - 2

• Example:

Let G be the procedure "always choose a", Let H be the procedure "always choose a[~]".

• Then the f-independence of the sum implies:

Say that for each y, f_1 and f_2 have the same total number of x's such that f(x) = y. However f_1 is "well-behaved" (e.g. smooth) and f_2 is "poorly-behaved" (e.g. jagged).

Say over a set of algorithms S, f_1 gives better performance than f_2 .

Then the opposite holds for the remaining algorithms, {a} - S

PAIRWISE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN ALGORITHMS

- 1) NFL only says first moments over f are a-independent
- 2) For higher order moments coupling the algorithms, there are a priori distinctions between algorithms.
- 3) E.g., there exist $a_1, a_2, d_{m,1}^Y, d_{m,2}^Y$ such that

$$\sum_{f} P(d_{m,1}^{Y} = z, d_{m,2}^{Y} = z' | f, m, a_{1}, a_{2}) \neq \sum_{f} P(d_{m,1}^{Y} = z', d_{m,2}^{Y} = z | f, m, a_{1}, a_{2})$$

PAIRWISE DISTINCTIONS - 2

3) However if there is no overlap between $d_{m,1}^X, d_{m,2}^X$, then

$$\sum_{f} P(d_{m,1}^{Y} = z, d_{m,2}^{Y} = z' | f, m, a_{1}, a_{2}) = \sum_{f} P(d_{m,2}^{Y} = z', d_{m,1}^{Y} = z | f, m, a_{1}, a_{2})$$

4) On the other hand, there are C(.), a_1 , a_2 , δ where $\exists f \text{ for which } E(C \mid f, m, a_1) - E(C \mid f, m, a_2) = \delta$ but

$$\neg \exists f \text{ for which } E(C \mid f, m, a_2) - E(C \mid f, m, a_1) = \delta$$

ROADMAP



MULTI-ARMED BANDITS

- 1) K "arms", each a real-valued stochastic process.
- 2) You know something about the arms.

E.g., each arm is a Gaussian, and all have the same standard deviation.

- 3) You sample the arms, one at a time, m times total. You record those sample values as "rewards".
- 4) A strategy maps

(all arm-reward pairs by time t) \rightarrow (next arm)

for all t.

5) What strategy maximizes summed reward at t = m?

SELF-PLAY

- 1) There is an N-player non-cooperative game whose payoff matrix Γ you don't fully know.
- 2) You repeatedly:
 - *i)* Choose the moves (strategies) of all N players;
 - *ii) Have them play those moves;*

iii) Record the resultant payoffs.

- 3) After this, player 1 (the <u>champion</u>) plays a move for a new set of N 1 <u>antagonists</u> whom you don't control.
- 4) How best perform (2), and then use its results, to choose champion's move for that subsequent game?

CO-EVOLUTION

- 1) N-player non-cooperative game with payoff matrix Γ .
- 2) In addition to its strategy s_i , each player i is associated with a population size or population frequency, u_i .
- 3) There is a fixed function T (perhaps partially determined by you), mapping

$$\Gamma$$
, { $s_i(t), u_i(t), : i = 1, ..., N$ }

$$\{s_i(t+1), u_i(t+1), : i = 1, ..., N\}.$$

E.g., the replicator dynamics.

5) Analyze this. E.g., what can T guarantee, for any Γ ?

ROADMAP



GENERALIZED OPTIMIZATION (GO) FRAMEWORK

1) Two spaces X and Z.

E.g., X is inputs, Z is distributions over outputs.

- 2) <u>Fitness Function</u> $f: X \rightarrow Z$
- 3) m (perhaps repeated) sampled points of f: $d_m = \{d_m(1), d_m(2), ..., d_m(m)\}$ where $\forall t$, $d_m(t) = \{d_m^X(t), d_m^Z(t)\}$

each $d_m^Z(t)$ a (perhaps stochastic) function of $f[d_m^X(t)]$

E.g., $d_m^Z(t)$ could be a sample of $f[d_m^X(t)]$ E.g., $d_m^Z(t)$ could be mean of $f[d_m^X(t)]$ E.g., $d_m^Z(t)$ could be $f[d_m^X(t)]$

GO FRAMEWORK - 2

- 4) Search algorithm $a = \{d_t \rightarrow d_m^X(t+1): t = 0, ..., m\}$
- 5) Euclidean vector-valued Cost function $C(f, d_m)$
- 6) To capture a particular type of optimization problem, much of the problem structure is expressed in C(.,.)

NFL theorems depend crucially on having C be independent of f.

If C depends on f, free lunches may be possible.

E.g., have C independent of (f, d_m) , unless $f = f^*$.

MULTI-ARMED BANDITS IN GO FRAMEWORK

- 1) X is the set of arms.
- 2) Each z is a Gaussian of known (x-independent) variance, with unknown (x-varying) mean.
- 3) Each $d_m^Z(t)$ is a random sample of the distribution $f[d_m^X(t)]$
- 4) C is independent of f: $C(d_m) = \sum_{t \le m} d_m^Z(t)$
- 5) However the search algorithm allows repeats.
- 6) Therefore there are free lunches; even without knowledge about the means of the Gaussian (i.e., about f's), some algorithms are preferred.

SELF-PLAY IN GO FRAMEWORK

1) For simplicity, take N = 2.

2) X is joint move. For simplicity, deterministic f;
Z is (a delta function about the) payoff to player 1.
(Recall we don't know payoff function, i.e., f.)

3) We choose the search algorithm a.

4) We also choose a function A(.) mapping our data d_m to the champion's move for the subsequent game.

SELF-PLAY IN GO - 2

5) More precisely, A's image is

A set of all $x \in X$, with some particular value of x_1 (which will be our champion's move).

- 6) For simplicity, have $C(d_m, f)$ reflect worst case behavior of the antagonist.
- 7) More precisely,

$$C(d_m, f) = \min_{x \in A(d_m)} f(x)$$

8) N.b., A(.) is specified in the "cost function" C.

SELF-PLAY IN GO - 3

9) Since C depends on f, free lunches may be possible

- in fact, they exist.

10) Example:

i) 2 possible moves for opponent, many for champion.

ii) m = 4.

- iii) In those 4 games, a selects the 4 moves $\{(1, x_2), (2, x_2)\}$.
- iv) A sets x_1 to either 1 or 2, depending on which was maximin superior in the 4 observed game outcomes, d_m .
- v) A' sets x_1 to whichever was maximin inferior.

 $E(C \mid f, m, A, a) \ge E(C \mid f, m, A', a) \quad \forall f; a free lunch.$

ROADMAP



NFL FOR SUPERVISED LEARNING - DEFINITIONS

- 1) Input space X, and Output space Y.
- 2) <u>Target Function</u> $f: X \rightarrow Y$
- 3) <u>Training set</u> of m sampled points of f:

 $d_{m} = \{d_{m}(1), d_{m}(2), ..., d_{m}(m)\}$ where $\forall t$, $d_{m}(t) = \{d_{m}^{X}(t), d_{m}^{Y}(t)\}$

- 4) Learning algorithm for predicting outputs: $a = (d_m, q \in X) \rightarrow Y$
- 5) Real-valued Cost function C[f(.), a(d_m, .)]. (Certain formal restrictions, e.g., off-training set q.)

Obvious extensions to stochastic f, a.

NFL FOR LEARNING - PRIMARY RESULTS

$$\sum_{f} P(C \mid f, m, a) = \sum_{f} P(C \mid f, m, a')$$

$$\forall a, a', d_{m}$$

Whether or not you use cross-validation, kernel machines, etc.

There is also an inherent geometry:

 $P(C \mid m, a) = a_{C,m} \bullet p$ where $p = P(f), \ a_{d_m^Y,m} = P(C \mid m, a, f)$ are both vectors indexed by f

ROADMAP



LIMITS ON MATH, SCIENCE AND BEYOND

- 1) NFL for supervised learning formalizes Hume: Science cannot give guarantees about future experiments based on results of previous experiments.
- 2) Godel's theorems say math cannot give guarantees about its own conclusions.
- *3)* No matter what simulation program it runs, no computer can give guarantees about any future physical experiment.

More generally, no system - even the universe itself - can give guarantees about prediction, control or observation.

COMPUTATION AND PHYSICS

- 1) Physical limitations of computational systems
 - Landauer's law, reversible computation, etc.
- 2) Computational limitations of physical systems
 - How fast / large can computation be while consistent with the fundamental laws of physics.
- **3)** More profoundly, might the universe *be* a computer?
 - Wheeler: "It from bit"

<u>Difficulty</u>: Chomsky hierarchy ill-suited to (3). What would it mean for universe to "be" a tape with a read/write head?

Solution: Formalize computation - more generally inference - as actually done in physical systems.



1) What α contains/contained the universe's worldline u at t?

The possible answers (outputs) of my computer themselves ... form a partition of U. (The computer lives in the universe.)
2) Must tell my computer what program it should run.

• Those possible inputs to the computer form a partition of U.

Computer = (input partition, output partition)



- 1) An *input partition* $X : u \rightarrow x$, the label of the input.
- 2) An *output partition* $Y : u \rightarrow (A, \alpha \in A)$, the pair of a set of possible *answers*, and an element of that set.
- 3) An *inference device* C is such a pair (X, Y).

Observation devices, control devices, computers: all are inference devices.

IMPOSSIBILITY OF INFERENCE

- No device can infer itself.
- No two distinguishable devices can infer each other
- 1) The universe may contain one device that can predict the rest of the universe but no more than one.
- 2) If you have many distinguishable devices, at most one can infer all the others: a <u>God</u> device.

I.e., at most one device that can (infallibly) observe / predict / control all distinguishable others: "Monotheism".

3) A time-translated copy of a God device cannot be a God device. I.e., God can only be infallible once: "Intelligent design".

ENGINEERING IMPLICATIONS OF IMPOSSIBILITY RESULT

- For any device simulating physical systems, there is always a prediction by it that cannot be guaranteed correct.
 (Even if just simulating external universe, if the simulator isn't a God device, always a prediction by it that can't be guaranteed.)
 Laplace was wrong.
- 2) For any recording apparatus, there is always a past event that cannot be guaranteed to have been correctly recorded.
- *3)* For any observation apparatus, there is always an observation by it that cannot be guaranteed to be correct.
 - Non-quantum mechanical "uncertainty principle"

CONCLUSIONS

- Much still to be investigated about search:

 P(f)-independent results (e.g., algorithm averages).
 The geometry of search
 The geometry of search
 A priori distinctions between search algorithms higher order correlations.
- Much still to be investigated about supervised learning:
 i) Relation between NFL and statistical learning theory
 ii) A priori distinctions between learning algorithms cross-validation vs. anti-cross-validation?
- 3) Much still to be investigated about inference devices:
 i) Analogs of algorithmic information complexity
 ii) Graphical relations between inference devices.